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OUTLINE OF THE GOLD CLAUSE CASES
ANGUS D. MACLEAN*
The Gold Clause Cases, four in number, consumed three days in
argument, January 8, 9 and 10, 1935, and were decided on February
18, 1935. Two of them,' decided together, the Norman case, which
came from the Court of Appeals of New York, and the Missouri Pacific
case, which the Supreme Court, on the Government's petition, took di-
rectly from the District Court in Missouri without awaiting decision by
the Circuit Court of Appeals-a procedure rarely adopted-involved
the gold clause in private obligations; specifically, in the Norman case,
a coupon for $22.50 attached to a bond issued by the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad, and in the Missouri Pacific case, in which the Govern-
ment intervened, an issue of bonds by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain
and Southern Ry., part of the Missouri Pacific system. The other
two, the Perry2 and Nortz3 cases, involved the gold clause in govern-
ment or national obligations, or payment in gold coin or its equivalent;
in the Perry case, a Liberty Loan Bond for $10,000, and in the Nortz
case, "yellow backs" or gold certificates for $106,300. These two suits
were instituted against the United States in the Court of Claims at
Washington and the controlling questions in them were certified by that
Court to the Supreme Court for answer, a practice permitted when the
question is of sufficient importance. All four cases, and others similar
in different parts of the country which never reached the Supreme
Court, arose out of Public Resolution No. 10 of the 73d Congress, en-
titled "Joint Resolution to assure uniform value to the Coins and Cur-
rencies of the United States' 4 and certain other legislation, Executive
orders, proclamations and Treasury rulings or regulations relating to le-
gal tender, the hoarding and surrender of gold and gold certificates,
and kindred subjects.
This Joint Resolution, approved June 5, 1933, not only declared
all gold clauses to be void, but enlarged the legal tender provisions of
* Mr. MacLean supervised the preparation of the Government's briefs in all
of the Gold Clause Cases. The principal argument in the Missouri Pacific Case
was made by Attorney General Homer Cummings, with Mr. Stanley Reed assist-
ing for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The Perry and Nortz cases were
argued by Mr. MacLean. He also argued the Government's intervention in the
Missouri Pacific Case at St. Louis, and prepared the petition to have the case
brought directly to the Supreme Court. He was at that time Assistant Solicitor
General of the United States.
I Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., U. S. v. Bankers' Trust Co., 294 U. S. 240,
55 Sup. Ct. 407, 79 L. ed. 885 (1935).
' Perry v. U. S., 294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 912 (1935).
'Nortz v. U. S., 294 U. S. 317, 55 Sup. Ct. 428, 79 L. ed. 907 (1935).
'48 Stat. 113 (1933), 31 U. S. C. A. §§462, 463 (1936).
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the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, so as to make them
inclusive of all coins and currencies of the United States and of all
kinds of debts and obligations, public and private.
It is said that gold clauses, such as we are considering here, have
been in use for many years, and grew out of the differences in value
of different kinds of money circulating at the same time, but the legal
tender acts of the Civil War period, which made greenbacks or paper
money legal tender for all purposes, with certain immaterial excep-
tions, stimulated their use and made it general.
This Resolution also, it will be noticed, not only declared gold clauses
contrary to public policy, but prohibited their further use, a prohibi-
tion, it turns out, which has not been strictly observed. On that point,
which is beside our present discussion, it is interesting to learn that
some recent issues were found to contain such clauses-due to an over-
sight of the lawyers, it was said-and Wall Street was puzzled to know
what to .do about them, wondering whether their insertion would make
the bonds invalid, but concluded that it would be sufficient to add a
clause or rider calling attention to the prohibition. Although not dis-
turbing to many of us, some idea of the potential significance of these
clauses may at once be gathered from the fact that the total of private
obligations containing them was estimated at 75 to 80 billion dollars
and of public or government obligations at 20 to 25 billion, a conserva-
tive aggregate of one hundred billion, while gold coin, in which they
were all payable, was actually 4 billion in this country, much of it in
hiding, and eleven billion in the world. Devaluation of the dollar or
reduction in its gold content to the extent proposed by the President
meant in effect that every dollar of indebtedness payable in gold, or its
equivalent, would be increased to $1.69, if gold clauses were main-
tained, and practically this meant bankruptcy on a national scale. This
was the situation which impelled Congress, confronted by a deep de-
pression, a banking collapse and a money panic, to adopt the Joint Res-
olution annulling all such clauses. It was also the background of the
Government's legal position. Its brief, while strongly supported by
authority, reviewed the economic and monetary crisis and to an unusual
extent employed graphs and tables to demonstrate that complete finan-
cial disaster was likely to ensue unless the Resolution was upheld, not
only to strengthen the presumption of constitutionality by showing that
the action of Congress was not capricious, but to establish affirmatively
a reasonable basis for Congressional determination that the gold clause
is contrary to public policy, inconsistent with our present monetary
system, under which all coins and currency are legal tender and of
relatively equal value, and an obstruction to the exercise by Congress of
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its monetary and other powers. So impressive were the facts and figures
that I convinced myself, at any rate, that the Supreme Court was virtually
obliged to sustain the action of Congress, if adequate legal ground could
be assigned, in order to save the country; and, from the narrow de-
cisions in the Nortz and Perry cases, adopting the Government's sec-
ondary rather than its primary position, I am satisfied the argument
in terrorem to some extent prevailed. This is by no means to admit,
however, that the Government's position did not rest on broad constitu-
tional and legal ground. In these cases, the attack on the Resolution
did not deny the power of Congress to control the currency, to declare
what should be legal tender, to call in the gold, to prevent hoarding in
the flight from the dollar by prohibiting its export; but those who at-
tacked the Resolution contended that they were entitled to be paid in
lawful money the equivalent in value of what their contracts called for,
and that the Resolution denied them due process, took their property
without compensation, the right to payment in gold being a property
right, and in part impaired the public debt, all contrary to the Consti-
tution, which not only did not authorize, but prohibited these things.
It is recogniz.ed that these are formidable positions and they were argued
with great force and earnestness, particularly in support of the sanc-
tity of the Government's wartime Liberty Bonds. But the Govern-
ment's main position was stronger, in my opinion. We relied, of course,
on a broad interpretation of the power of the Congress to coin money
and regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and gathered much
support from certain of the Legal Tender Cases, of which there were
several and which, in their day, were as important as the Gold Clause
Cases became sixty years later. The Legal Tender Acts, which it is
said saved the country in the Civil War, when the notion of coin or
hard money was much stronger than it is today, made greenbacks le-
gal tender for private debts and other purposes, with some exceptions.
We had difficulty in distinguishing the case of Bronson v. Rodes,5 which
rested on the difference in the kinds of money then in circulation. This
case was followed by Hepburn v. Griswold,6 which held that the Le-
gal Tender Act was invalid as to debts created prior to its passage, but
Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled by the later Legal Tender Cases, 7
in which the Court fully sustained the Legal Tender Acts and made use
of the expression "Whatever power there is over the currency is vested
in Congress. If the power to declare what is money is not in Congress,
it is annihilated." s The distinction was also pointed out that the declara-
'7 Wall. 229, 19 L. ed. 141 (1868).
68 Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513 (1870).
'Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1872) Juilliard v. Green-
man, 110 U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122, 28 L. ed. 204 (1884)."12 Wall. 545, 20 L. ed. 310.
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tion against laws which impaired the obligation of contracts, as the Reso-
lution expressly did, applied only to the States and not to Congress and
that the plenary power of Congress over currency could not and should
not be diminished by provisions in private contracts; further, that this
power could not be curtailed or surrendered by similar provisions in
public obligations.
The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Strong in the Legal Tender
cases and the concurring opinion of Mr. justice Bradley, as well as the
later opinion of Mr. Justice Gray in Juilliard z. Greenman, suggested
that the Government's power in money matters was not only plenary, by
virtue of the Constitution, but inherent, and this led to the taking by
us of the advanced position that power over coinage and currency is an
attribute of sovereignty, as much so in this country as any other.
Secondary positions were also taken, such as impossibility of per-
formance, it being contended that the clauses in suit called for the pay-
ment in gold coin, an impossibility-it could not be had, none was avail-
able, and its possession would be unlawful since Congress had exer-
cised its undoubted power of calling in all the gold and prohibiting its
circulation. In the Nortz and Perry cases, it was also contended that
no damage had been sustained or could be shown since legal tender
currency would buy just as much and pay as many debts as gold coin-
one dollar being equal to every other in value-and if a man had to
give up a gold bond or gold certificate for other lawful money he was
equally as well off as before, at least in this country, export of gold to
any other being prohibited.
Among the cases cited against us were the Feist case,9 decided on
appeal by the House of Lords, and the Serbian and Brazilian bond
cases,' 0 decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, in
which gold clauses were held to require payment of an equivalent in
value, but the decisions in these cases, as we pointed out to the Court,
turned entirely upon the construction to be placed on these clauses in
the absence of any statute intended to abrogate them, it appearing that
the parties contracted in terms of a measure of value and not a mode
of payment.
It was also pointed out, of course, that these cases conflicted with
no legislative policy or prohibition such as that declared in the Joint
Resolution of Congress, and that no question of power was involved.
It was shown in the Government's brief that since 1928 Great Britain
and various other leading countries had gone off the gold standard
before this country; that, at the end of 1932, over thirty countries had
adopted measures for the control of their foreign exchange, and that
Feist v. Soci&t6 Intercommunale Beige d'Electricit6 [1934] A. C. 161.
loSerbian and Brazilian Bond Cases, P. C. I. J., series A., Nos. 20/21 (1929).
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their power to do so was unquestioned. For what it was worth, we
were able to cite later the decision of a Netherlands Court upholding
the validity of the Congressional Resolution.
The result his now passed into history, so far as gold clauses are
concerned, but the decision of the Court was awaited in Washington
and elsewhere with great anxiety. When the opinions were delivered,
the famous little Supreme Court room was overflowing with Senators,
officials and others interested, and I understand that the President him-
self, at the White House, followed the opinions closely.
The Chief Justice delivered the majority opinions with great vigor
and was followed by Mr. Justice McReynolds, who opened his dissent-
ing opinion with the ominous statement that "The Constitution is gone."
In the Norman and Missouri Pacific cases, the power of Congress
to strike down gold clauses was fully sustained, the Chief Justice de-
claring at the close of the opinion: "We think that it is clearly shown
that these clauses interfere with the exertion of the power granted to
the Congress, and certainly it is not established that the Congress arbi-
trarily or capriciously decided that such an interference existed."
In contrast, the dissenting opinion begins with the declaration that
"If given effect, the enactments here challenged will bring about con-
fiscation of property rights and repudiation of national obligations."
In the Perry case, however, the Court took a different view as to
government bonds, holding that the provision of the 14th Amendment
that the validity of the public debt of the United States should not be
questioned applied to bonds issued after, as well as before the Amend-
ment, and that the Joint Resolution was unconstitutional as to pre-
existing Liberty Loan gold bonds. The Court, nevertheless, sustained
the Government's secondary position and denied any recovery to the
plaintiff, who was seeking, so the Court said, "not a recoupment of loss
in any proper sense, but an unjustified enrichment."
A short concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Stone in this case also
aroused great interest, because of his statement that it was unnecessary
and undesirable for the Court to say that the obligation of the gold
clause in government bonds was greater than in the bonds of private
individuals, and because of his suggestion that all doubts might be
transferred to the realm of speculation if Congress simply exercised
its undoubted power of withdrawing the right to sue. This sugges-
tion, it should be added, was soon followed by Bills withdrawing this
right, but they evoked much criticism and were so modified as to per-
mit the right if exercised by a set future date.
The main questions having been discussed in the bond cases, the
Nortz case, on gold certificates, was disposed of in harmony with the
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government's contention that since its power of control over coin and
currency was admitted and since Nortz had shown no actual damages
and the Court of Claims was not authorized to award nominal dam-
ages only, he could recover nothing and the demurrer should be sus-
tained; the Court laying aside the questions whether the government
had ever consented to be sued upon its own currency as upon an ex-
press contract and whether the suit could be maintained in the Court
of Claims as a taking of property without just compensation.
Mr. Justice McReynolds concluded his lugubrious dissent in all
these cases with the prediction that "Loss of reputation for honorable
dealing will bring us unending humiliation; the impending legal and
moral chaos is appalling." It is too close to the event to appraise fu-
ture consequences, but so far it can fairly be replied that no such chaos
has occurred and that even now the three great democracies of the
world have turned toward monetary stabilization. What has been de-
cided is that in a conflict between the obligation of private contracts
and the power of Congress over the monetary system of the country,
the private right must give way to public policy.
